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In recent years, social networking has become a tool of communication that transcends 
geography. This thesis explores the ways Moroccan college-age youth are using new media. I 
examine existing ways of conceiving and constructing identity and privacy to see how 
Moroccans reconcile these influences online. This provokes further questions, such as how do 
Moroccans conceive of privacy online? Does gender impact the construction of an online 
persona? Does religiosity impact online interaction? Using both academic and field research, I 
argue that Moroccans reconcile existing local expectations to their daily personae in the online 
space. I investigate these questions using field research and a survey of 62 college-age Rabatis. 
Gendered expectations, communal expectations, and religiosity permeate the networks and shape 
the rules that Moroccan youth are inventing for this online space. Finally, I turn to the February 
20th and examine how the use of social networks during the Arab Spring reflects these broader 
trends. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, the world took notice when a wave of protests swept across North Africa and the 
Middle East. Throughout the region, protestors used social networking websites1 to achieve their 
goals. For example, Egyptian protesters created a Facebook page after the murder of Khaled Said 
as a “requiem for the dead blogger” and “on the one year anniversary of Khaled’s murder, anti-
torture activists stenciled Khaled’s image all over Cairo” (Dabashi 2012:100). The social 
networking revolution, while not the cause of these protests, motivated and facilitated the 
protests that occurred on the streets. Similarly, in Morocco, protesters used social networking 
sites like Facebook to alert protestors of the schedules and locations concerning the schedules 
and locations of protests (Al-Arabiya 2011).  
Since the Arab Spring, social networking has not faded across North Africa and the 
Middle East. Instead, it has attracted more popularity, arguably in part due to the attention placed 
on the sites during the Arab Spring. Indeed, one report found that Facebook usage doubled in 
some parts of the region between January and April 2011 (Huang 2011). 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, I use “social networking” to mean communication through the new, online media forms, 
particularly regarding Facebook and Twitter. More formally, social networking websites are, “web –based services 
that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made 
by others within the system” (Boyd and Ellison [2007]; cited from Elgarah [2009]: 169). 
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In order to better understand how and why revolutionaries made use of new media, we 
must first take a step back to understand the origins and development of social networking in the 
region, who uses social networking websites, and how. Although it is easy to imagine monolithic 
usage of social networking within the region—and even globally—local culture and tradition 
likely impact the way each country’s youth use new media. 
 Morocco, in particular, is an interesting place to study the ways social networking 
intersects with social and political life. Morocco has a rich cultural and historical fabric and has 
followed a distinct political trajectory in recent years, changing its constitution in response to the 
Arab Spring. In fact, Morocco has been viewed as the politically responsible answer to the 
people’s complaints. However, political transformations in Morocco have been largely 
superficial. It is in this unique and complex setting that I explore social networking.  
 Of course, not all Moroccans are equally likely to make use of social media. Social 
networking websites are inherently shaped by the mindset of the fairly wealthy, educated 
Moroccan youth that use these sites. With 80% of its users younger than 30, Morocco is only 
ranked behind Yemen and Palestine for the youngest, active group of social networkers in the 
region (North Africa United 2012). Yet, especially in cultures that prioritize familial relations, 
the young are often subaltern—politically, socially, and culturally excluded from the dominant 
power structures. In Moroccan culture, generational respect and obedience still feature 
prominently in daily life. New media offer youth a chance to create their own identities and 
voices without deferring to their guardians. 
 Even among young people, cultural influences are likely to shape the ways in which 
different groups of Moroccans use social media. Culture is a way of allowing a community to 
live collectively and is shaped by a variety of forces, including economic, political, and social. 
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The roles and expectations of gender and religion factor into shaping societal values; these 
factors are poignant in a discussion of social networking because they help elucidate 
discrepancies in usage across gender and religious intensity. 
In this study, I consider how Moroccan culture and the spatial divisions in Moroccan life 
shape how college-age youth have come to use social networking sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter. I consider how Moroccans present themselves in everyday life and then turn my 
attention to online personas in recent years as social networking became popular in Morocco 
only during the last five years. I focus on multiple aspects of social media usage, from the use of 
personal photographs to language use of social networking sites to preferences about types of 
sites. I also consider how gender and religiosity influence the ways in which Moroccans use 
networking in daily life.  
 My study suggests that local understandings of spatiality and traditional and gendered 
expectations of daily dress have impacted the ways in which Moroccan youth use—or at least 
consider—social networking. These cultural influences are most obvious in the images posted 
online and the privacy settings. In particular, I find that female subjects have been more hesitant 
in using social networking especially with regards to posting photos. I also suggest that better 
understanding the way Moroccans use social media in their everyday lives may also inform the 
ways we think about the political uses of online media in Morocco during and since the Arab 
Spring.  
 In the following sections, I will explore the ways in which existing social constructs 
shape everyday networking. I will begin with a brief overview of the political and economic 
history of Morocco since the 1970s. Then, I analyze the evolving uses of social networking in 
Morocco and then consider the cultural influences that can help explain these trends. I will then 
 4 
assess the construction of an online persona, focusing especially on online images. After 
introducing my data and methodology, I will present qualitative and quantitative results of my 
investigation. I conclude by linking my results back to social movements.  
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE MOROCCAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
SINCE THE 1970’S 
 
Before exploring the nature of Moroccan social networks, the history of the country must first be 
understood. Only in understanding the current political situation can one comprehend the 
evolving ways in which Moroccan youth are using these networks.  
After the nominal end of the colonial era (1912-1956), Morocco worked to extend its 
control over industries formerly under French colonial control. Yet, the state did not effectively 
promote local industry so that it might be globally competitive. Moroccan industry still relied on 
imports without having developed suitable internal economic infrastructure. Nevertheless, the 
state saw some success in the 1970’s primarily due to the export of phosphates and the mining 
industry.  
With two failed military coups in the 1970’s, King Hassan II promoted the rise of a loyal 
middle class at the expense of the lower classes. Households in the lowest 40% of income 
“dropped in percentage of the total consumption from 18% in 1959-60 to 12% in 1970-71” 
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(Cohen 2006:36). The failure to reduce poverty became an external concern, and international 
organizations suggested structural adjustment and market reform programs in the early 1980’s. 
Morocco complied with most of the prescriptions from external organizations, such as the Club 
of Paris and the World Bank. For example, during the 1980’s, in accordance with the World 
Bank and IMF requirements, the Moroccan government devalued the currency and generally 
increased the government control over public expenditures. Even with this external guidance, 
inconsistent development has fueled high rates of unemployment and an unequal wealth 
distribution.  
In the 1990’s, faced with growing social unrest and growing dissatisfaction with the 
seemingly omnipresent poverty and related social concerns, King Hassan II worked for limited 
political reforms. These reforms included closing Tazmamart, a prison infamous for human 
rights abuses, and creating a bicameral legislature. The current king, King Mohammed VI, has 
been declared the reformer of the modern era, but closer inspection reveals that many of the 
reforms accredited to him began under the reign of his father, who realized that reforms were 
necessary to sustain the monarchy.  
King Mohammed VI came into the monarchy after what King Hassan called 
“homeopathic democracy,” a series of incremental steps towards a more progressive politics. 
Although Mohammed VI did not move towards a constitutional monarchy, he did continue—or 
at least appeared to continue—to move towards political liberalization. He expanded social 
welfare and encouraged a tolerant form of Islam that has been branded as “Moroccan Islam.” 
This brand of Islam, for many scholars, means, “ordinary life is secular enough to suit the most 
dedicated rationalist, and religious considerations, for all their intensity, are operative over only a 
few, fairly well demarcated regions of behavior, so that one gets a ruthlessness in, for example, 
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commercial and political affairs” (Geertz 1971:112). 
 Mohammed VI also allowed a degree of Islamist political activity. The Party for Justice 
and Development was first brought into power by his father in 1997 and was permitted to 
develop into the leading political party within Morocco. As had his predecessors, Mohammed VI 
continued limiting political parties’ powers. With a fragmented political system, no single party 
holds more than 15% of the seats in parliament, which leaves them acquiescent to the king’s 
influence. Mohammed VI also worked to balance the conservatives and traditional Islamic 
powers by focusing on liberal reforms, such as the 2004 Moudawana (the Moroccan Family 
Code). However, the difficulties of sustaining the monarchy continued as evidenced by the 2011 
February 20th movement (Cohen 2006).  
On February 20th, protests spread across major cities in response to long-existing political 
concerns. The brunt of the protests was aimed at the Makhzen, or the governing elite, rather than 
the king. Protest groups—such as the eponymous February 20th Movement (originally called 
“Freedom and Democracy Now”)—emerged on Facebook before the February 20th protests in 
Morocco. The initial protests were organized sit-ins in solidarity with the Egyptian protestors. 
These sit-ins eventually evolved into demonstrations for their own demands. The protests helped 
motivate a revised constitution, although many critics have claimed the revisions were only 
nominal.  
Still, to acknowledge the role social networking played in this movement is not to assign 
it causality. There is a distinction between the Internet as a space—which “refers to both the 
structural aspects of the internet and society”—and the Internet as a tool—or “the tactical aspects 
and political agency” (Aouragh 2012:526). Social networks facilitated the revolution simply 
because they were the existing tool for social communication. While these networks were 
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important in spreading awareness, their actual effectiveness in motivating offline involvement is 
more uncertain. While the spread of social networking “benefits movement activists, it also 
enables weakly committed people to opt into social movements at low cost and with little risk—
and to drop out just as easily” (Brym 2012:12). 
Nevertheless, during the February 20th movement, protest groups followed other North 
African nations and utilized social networking to motivate their protest demographic. As the 
majority of protestors in Morocco were the urban, unemployed youth, social networks were a 
practical and accessible means for them to organize and promote demonstrations. Social 
networking did not launch the Arab Spring but did facilitate protest activity. However, social 
networking is more than a tool for protest. I suggest social networking can be understood as a 
tool for subaltern emancipation. Yet, there is still much to learn about social networking in 
Morocco. Although recent scholarship has worked to understand social networking through the 
lens of the Arab Spring, the daily uses of social networking are just as essential to understand. 
 
2.2 MOROCCAN CULTURE, GEOGRAPHIC SPACE, AND SOCIAL 
NETWORKING  
Today, Moroccan culture is neither a monolithic construct of Orientalism nor is it a concession to 
Westernization. Of the globalizing forces, creolization—which embraces the fluidity of cultures, 
notes that cultural forces become localized, and imbeds the western with local culture (Hensby 
2011)—seems particularly relevant in a discussion of both Moroccan culture and its social 
networks.  
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Culture is a set of practices that allows a group to live collectively. Moroccan culture is 
not a separate entity from the Western influences. To search for the boundary between these 
cultures is to imagine culture as a static entity; rather, culture is fluid, and so Moroccan culture 
has been influenced by countless external forces and has assumed them until they become an 
integral part of the culture. In my decision to analyze the distinct architectural forms, I do not 
intend to fracture Moroccan culture. Rather, I attempt to understand how these distinct 
conceptions of spatiality and persona are impacting modern Moroccan culture. 
On the one hand, more traditional cultural influences are still alive in Morocco. 
According to Hofstede (1991), two important cultural distinctions exist between those who are 
more or less individualistic and between those who have greater or lesser levels of “uncertainty 
avoidance,” an indicator of a society’s proclivity for the established and traditional. According to 
Hofstede’s (1991) research, Morocco has only moderate levels of individualism (a value of 46, 
while the world average is 43 and the United States scored a 91). Additionally, Morocco’s 
“uncertainty avoidance” (68) ranks slightly above the world (64) and far above the United States 
(46). Together, these measures suggest that Morocco remains in some ways largely community-
based and traditional. 
Hofstede also notes the Moroccan power distance as 70 (40 for the United States and a 
world average of 55). The notably high Moroccan score indicates high levels of political, social, 
and economic inequalities. These inequalities—a legacy of the failed neoliberal policies of 
Hassan II and the political frustrations that helped motivate the February 20th movement—refer 
back to the unequal access to social networking. While social networking sites are a useful form 
of expression and, with regards to the Arab Spring, of mobilization, the reality is that not 
everyone can access the Internet. This hinders social networks’ potential as fully democratic 
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media. Thus, the demographic of Moroccan social networking members is less diverse, and the 
simple factor of Internet access speaks to an economic status of the demographic. Social 
networks are inherently shaped by the mindset of this fairly wealthy, educated youth. 
Social networks are worlds without geographical limits. This new space is devoid of 
historical rules of spatiality but simultaneously allows for users to shape how it is used in each 
locality. Within Morocco, traditional concepts of spatiality shape the ways in which these 
networks are used, and they have been creolized in the media’s interaction with locally specific 
ways of organizing and understanding social space. In adapting these networks to the Moroccan 
context, Moroccans are reconciling Western concepts of spatiality with particular, local 
understandings. The tension between these two concepts has encouraged a similar tension online: 
Moroccans are acutely aware of the public privacy of these networks. The phrase public privacy 
attempts to capture the privacy users have in creating their profiles that will then be viewed by a 
public audience; further, these networks were used as an online public space to communicate, 
especially within the revolutionary context when they were used to coordinate efforts. These 
conventions of the persona in daily life are influencing the online persona. Moroccans are 
navigating a new space that is further blurring the boundaries between these culturally distinct 
views of self-presentation (Velitri and Elgarah 2009).  
On the other hand, Morocco has been influenced by its colonial past. The French 
influence has lingered not only in the architecture but also in the education systems, in the 
spoken language, and in countless other ways. As culture is not static, there is not an inherent 
dichotomy between indigenous and colonial influences. Instead, Moroccan culture is an 
amalgam; nevertheless, some cultural factors have more obvious roots. The colonial influences 
are simultaneously an integral part of Moroccan culture and a memory of the colonial past. Still, 
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some also suggest that Morocco’s recent history has shown its openness to Western ideas and 
guidance. Culturally, then, Morocco is a landscape full of varied identities and ways of 
understanding the world. 
The creolization of Moroccan culture is also reflected in the geographic spaces of modern 
Morocco, even in the cities’ architecture. During the French colonial period, French architects 
were sent to restructure the colonial landscapes (Wright 1987). Within Morocco, the medina 
qadeema, or the “old city,” remained more traditional while the French villes nouvelles, or “new 
cities,” sprang up, encouraging different consciousness (see Figures 1 and 2 below). Within cities 
like Fez, Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes, and Marrakech, the French vision was reinforced by 
greenbelts surrounding the medina qadeema walls, marking them as physically distinct ways of 
conceptualizing social space. 
 
Figure 1: The medina qadeema 
The medina qadeema’s streets have 
smaller dimensions than those of the ville 
nouvelle. 
 
Figure 2: The ville nouvelle 
The ville nouvelle’s buildings are distinct entities 
whereas the medina’s homes are a more natural part 
of the street’s flow. 
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Within a modern context, these visible barriers—the green belts and the walls of the 
medina—structure Moroccan social life. Life around the medina qadeema is more traditional 
whereas life around the villes nouvelles is more socially liberal (Wright 1987). Economic 
inequalities—a legacy of the failed neoliberal policies of Hassan II—also are visible spatially as 
economic disparities between the medina qadeema and the ville nouvelle. While these two spaces 
are not inherently antagonistic, there are general trends that distinguish them, and the ville 
nouvelle tends to be the wealthier area.   
Distinctions between the public and private are also central to the organization of social 
spaces in Morocco. The medina has an interconnected layout with houses in close proximity to 
shopping centers; in many ways, it has a more organic layout than the ville nouvelle, which is 
mapped according to architectural guidelines. Although the sectors of the medina qadeema are 
less defined, the familial spaces are branched off from the hanood2. The fluid layout encourages 
communal interaction, but there is still domestic privacy in the way the households cluster away 
from public areas. Further, the overarching walled structure envelops the community and 
encourages a collective intimacy.  
Females most acutely feel the dichotomy between public and private spaces. Movement 
is defined by one simple rule: “One should remain within the space reserved for one’s own 
gender… The feminine space is directed inwards, toward the courtyard; the masculine space is 
directed toward the outside, the streets” (Newcomb 2006:294). Women’s roles have become 
more public over time; after independence, women were allowed to move from the domestic 
space into the workforce, and female employment increased by 75% in the 1960’s (Newcomb 
2006:295). Further, fertility rates have declined: in 1972, the rate was 7 children per woman; a 
                                                 
2 The term hanood translates to “the store,” and is different than the souq, which tends to sell more clothing, gifts, 
etc. The hanood offers basic foods and drinks. 
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1993 rate was 4 children per woman. Also, Moroccan literacy has steadily improved from 1971’s 
rate of 1 out of every 5 Moroccans (15 and over) to 1991’s rate of 1 in 2. Female literacy is still 
behind male literacy, though; in 1991, 38% of females were literate compared to 61% of males 
(Population Trends 1993). Feminine movement remains subject to rules of environment, social 
class, and religiosity.   
So how does the creolization of Moroccan culture and social spaces translate to social 
networking, a new world that exists without geographical limits? Tensions between Western and 
local cultural practice and spatiality are likely to play out online. Yet, social networking may also 
be a space for adaptation and reconciliation as the media interacts with local ways life. In 
adapting social networking to the Moroccan context, Moroccans are reconciling Western culture 
with particular, local understandings. 
Although social networking may lack geographic boundaries, the distinctions evident in 
Moroccan life are likely mirrored online. For example, just as economic boundaries are visible in 
the geographic spaces of Moroccan cities, social networking in Morocco is also shaped by class 
status. Indeed, Velitri and Elgarah (2009) suggest that social networking within Morocco might 
have a more pronounced status association than in the United States. While social networking 
sites are a useful form of expression and, with regards to the Arab Spring, of mobilization, the 
reality is that not everyone can access the Internet. In short, the economic makeup of Moroccan 
social networking members is less diverse.  
Tensions between the public and private are also an important consideration for young 
Moroccans, who are acutely aware of the public privacy of social networking sites. Thus, I 
expect conventions regarding the presentation of self in Moroccan daily life to influence online 
persona. At the same time, by navigating a world that lacks geographic boundaries, Moroccans 
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may blur the boundaries between culturally distinct views of self-presentation. I expect these 
dynamics may play out online through variation in preferences for different networking websites, 
in whether and how individuals post images online, and in the use privacy settings. 
In addition to class and age divisions, social networking in Morocco is also unevenly 
divided by gender: only 39% of Moroccan Facebook users are female (Malin 2010). In the 
United States, by contrast, 60% of Facebook users are female (Report 2012). Overall, then, 
gender is likely to shape who uses social networking. Yet, I am also interested in considering 
which women use social networking and how those women choose to present themselves. In 
particular, my study considers whether women who use social networking sites choose to wear 
the hijab. 
 
 
 
 
2.3 GENDERED EXPECTATIONS OF DRESS: UNDERSTANDING THE HIJAB  
 
To understand if, how, and why Moroccan women may choose to display themselves wearing 
the hijab online, I first provide a background of the veil in Islam and throughout the region. It is 
necessary to explore this issue because it has become conflated with Islam in mainstream media, 
and so I intend to illuminate its history and illustrate its many dimensions and significances. 
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The significance of the hijab varies over time and space, and even with the most thorough 
comprehension, it is impossible to construct a singular definition for a word full of multiple 
significances and implications. Generally, however, the hijab is understood in the West as the 
veil or the Islamic headscarf. Although the history of the veil is bound to the tapestry of other 
faiths, the hijab today is associated with Muslim women.  
Even among practicing Muslims, not all women wear the hijab. In part, this is due to the 
fact that the importance of the hijab within Islamic religious texts is ambiguous. In fact, many 
scholars dispute the justification for the hijab within the religious texts. After all,  
 
The Qur’an does not mention veils or headscarves at all, but speaks of the need to 
erect a ‘curtain’ (hijab) between women and men, which in specific contexts can 
mean keeping women separate from men in a house, or wearing concealing 
garments. But this second use is explicitly introduced only with respect to 
Muhammad’s wives, in a passage where the Qur’an mentions the long flowing 
garment known as jilbab: ‘O Prophet, tell thy wives and thy daughters, and the 
women of the believers to draw their jilbab close round them… so that they may 
be recognized and not molested’ (33:59). The use of jilbab in this way was 
closely linked in the minds of believers to Muhammad, such that the phrase she 
took the jilbab was used to mean that someone became a wife of Muhammad. 
Veiling already was practiced in some parts of the Middle East by higher classes, 
perhaps to signify the possession of sufficient wealth that the veiled or secluded 
woman did not have to work in the fields. In any case, it is nowhere prescribed in 
the Qur’an, Only one verse is directed to all women, and it enjoins women to 
cover their private parts and throw cloths over their bosoms. (Bowen 2007:68-69) 
 
While some scholars understand the hijab as an exclusive demand for the wives of 
Muhammad, others point to Qur’anic justification. After all, within the surrah al-baqara it 
admonishes women to cover their beauty: 
Allah wants you to guard your beauty, lower your gaze, and protect your chastity. 
He wants you to cover your beauty, but not in the presence of you Mahram males, 
such as the members of your family. Lastly, Allah (Exalted and Glorified is He) 
wants you to wear modest clothing, and to behave modestly; this is your path to 
Paradise. 
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While some scholars point to the development of this surrah—as it goes on to say 
women must cover their bosoms and private parts—others focus on the ambiguity of “beauty.” 
Further, some scholars point to the protocol of prayer. When a woman prays, she is to uncover 
her face and her hands, but she is also obliged to cover her hair. Essentially, the necessity of 
wearing the hijab is complicated by the ambiguity of the text. Its appearances in sunnah and the 
Qur’an are detailed but not unequivocal.  
The hijab is not only complicated within the religious texts but also culturally and 
historically as the concept of veiling is a trans-religious phenomenon. Renowned Egyptian 
scholar Nawal El-Saadawi writes that the veil “was a product of Judaism long before Islam came 
into being. It was drawn from the Old Testament where women were abjured to cover their heads 
when praying to Jehovah, whereas men could remain bareheaded because they had been created 
in the image of God” (El-Saadawi 1980:5). In the three major Abrahamic religions—Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam—the concept of feminine head coverings transcends the boundaries and 
distinctions of the faiths. By the Middle Ages, covering one’s hair as a matter of religious 
obligation was firmly entrenched. Jewish women were expected to cover their hair; it was, in 
fact, this expectation that eventually evolved into the halakhic practice to wear a wig instead of a 
headscarf. For Christians, the phrase “taking the veil” is a euphemism for becoming a nun. After 
all, in the Christian—especially Catholic—tradition, the veil is a vision of womanhood and piety. 
The Mother of God is depicted in traditional art as a veiled, hallowed woman. As another 
example, in Roman Catholic services until Vatican II (1962-1965), it was mandatory for women 
to have a head covering as a sign of respect while they were in the church and for men to remove 
their head coverings at the same time. In Islam, of course, the hijab is a phenomenon made 
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emblematic of Muslim women through tradition and the Western media, though its necessity is 
ambiguous within the Islamic texts. Moreover, throughout the three Abrahamic faiths, the hijab 
has evolved and transformed itself into new cultural and religious manifestations. 
The veil is not a Qur’anic phenomenon, and its meaning has thus changed in various 
Islamic states. It first emerged in the Muslim elite in the reign of the Safavids in Iran and the 
Ottoman Empire. Further, the veil became pervasive only in the nineteenth century.  While it has 
been justified in the name of Islam, colonials were the first to promote it as an Islamic symbol 
(Moghissi 1999:86). It then became a sign of Islamic devotion in 1967, according to Geraldine 
Brooks, after the catastrophic defeat of Egyptian forces in the Six Day War. In order to “explain 
the humiliation, Muslim philosophers pointed to the secularism of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
government, and urged Egyptians to return to the Islamic laws they had abandoned,” though the 
veil became more politically significant after Iran’s theocratic revolution. In 1935, the shah’s 
father banned the chador in the hopes of presenting a modernized Iran to the world. The ban 
lasted until 1941, when “draconian enforcement eased, but unveiling continued to be encouraged 
and women who wished to veil were derided as backward.” With this continued, albeit lessened 
pressure, the 1970s became a time of revolutionary pressure. Wearing the chador became a 
symbol of protest. For one Iranian woman, Hamideh, “the chador symbolized liberation. She put 
it on a year before the Iranian revolution of 1978, and when she occupied the U.S. embassy, she 
wore it like a flag” (Brooks 1995:23-25). During the movement for liberation in Algeria, the veil 
was a similar symbol of protest. “The veil stood for the dignity and validity of all native customs 
under fiercest attack, particularly customs pertaining to women, ones the occupier was 
determined to control” (Heath 2008:220). Other scholars point to external motivation: Haideh 
Moghissi writes that for Egyptians, “the revived veil is linked to the failure of over a century of 
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capitalist modernization to secure palpable improvements in women’s lives or change cultural 
and religious patriarchal values and practices […] it is the crisis of Third World-style 
modernization that defines women’s choices, not the spiritual and ideological attraction of Islam 
and the veil” (Moghissi 1999:44). 
Thus, the meaning of the hijab and the motivation to wear it is not so transparent as that 
mandated by the religion. Identities are shaped by not simply religious expectations but 
traditional ones as well. 
The links between the hijab and cultural tradition are also evident in the way spatial 
boundaries are constructed in Morocco. For example, in public settings expectations of dress are 
distinct between the medina qadeema and the ville nouvelle. Women present themselves 
differently in daily life within the walls of the medina compared to those outside the walls.  
Cultural expectations for women’s behavior are expressed not only through the ways 
women dress but also through the way clothing is presented to them. In fact, the advertising of 
clothing perhaps speaks most clearly to the gendered expectations of different spaces in 
Moroccan cities. Within Rabat, the mannequins changed with the style of clothes presented and 
locale. Within the medina, mannequins tended to be partial (meaning bodied mannequins without 
head or parts of bodies). Also, there were stores dedicated to selling hijab within the medina. 
Outside the medina walls, mannequins tended to have bodies and heads. Some of these 
mannequins also had wigs put on them. This disparity not only speaks to the expectations of 
daily persona among women but also to the economic distinction between the medina and the 
ville nouvelle. 
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Figure 3: Inside medina qadeema 
 
Figure 4: Outside medina qadeema 
Image of mannequin within Rabat’s medina qadeema. The 
medina stores are mostly open air stores in contrast with 
the closed stores of the ville nouvelle. 
Image of mannequins outside the medina walls; this store 
was still close to the medina. As the distance from the 
medina increases, the mannequins becomes newer and 
more in line with what would be found in a Western style 
mall. 
 
Distinctions between the public and the private also affect where women wear the hijab. 
Women who wear the hijab will do so in public. In domestic spaces in the presence of mahram 
(a male blood relative to whom marriage is forbidden) or other females, women can remove the 
hijab. The domestic space allows Moroccans, especially females, to present themselves in a way 
distinct from the ways women portray themselves in public through their public personas. 
Drawing from this background and my observations of gendered spaces in Morocco, I 
endeavor to better understand the ways in which women present themselves online. Although my 
research can help clarify major trends in whether women choose to wear the hijab, I cannot 
capture the motivation for the practice. Nevertheless, I believe that, in analyzing the physically 
visible spatial constructions, we can better comprehend why Moroccans are using social 
networking in distinct ways. 
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2.4 SOCIAL NETWORKING PRACTICES IN MOROCCO 
 
In the absence of a country-specific social networking site (as found in countries such as Poland 
[Grono.net] and Iran [Cloob.com]), Moroccan youth have appropriated American Facebook and 
Twitter into a Moroccan context, and Facebook has become the most popular social networking 
site within Morocco. The Arab Social Media Report released a penetration rate of 11.92% for 
Facebook in Morocco contrasted with only 0.08% for Twitter (North Africa United 2012). Other 
social networking sites pale in comparison to the supernova that is Facebook. While these 
percentages may seem low, it is important to remember the large youth populations. Currently, 
the majority of Moroccan users are under 30, and while there are still low penetration rates, the 
large youth population portends potential growth. The penetration rate stands to increase, and, 
consequently, Facebook’s popularity stands to rise.  
Still, although Facebook has the sheer numbers, Twitter is still an effective force within 
Morocco. The same Arab Social Media report indicates that Morocco ranks third in the Arab 
world for the number of tweets with a monthly average of 750,000. However, Twitter carries the 
connotation of elitism. The demographic of users is markedly different than those on Facebook. 
The most followed Twitter accounts in Morocco, according to Twitaholic, are Moutaki Jawad, 
the PJD Officiel, and Hespress. Jawad is a Moroccan musician; the next two are the major 
political party and a news source respectively. 
I suggest the discrepancy in social networking sites in Morocco may relate to spatiality. 
Twitter is more internal and intellectual while Facebook is more communal. Thus, while politics 
and businesses cannot ignore Twitter’s demographic, they need to access that communal force 
that has made revolutions in other North African countries so successful. The nature of Facebook 
 21 
is predominantly one of community, which complements traditional Moroccan values. 
Therefore, most political and revolutionary groups invest more time into their Facebook pages as 
their very survival depends upon the foundation of a community. As Twitter remains polarized 
and virtually exclusive to highly educated, wealthier individuals, Facebook has accessed a 
broader—albeit still limited— demographic.  
 
2.5 THE ONLINE PERSONA AND THE IMAGE ONLINE 
 
The question of self-representation is inherent to social networking because the very nature of 
these sites allows their users to construct their own identities. Social networks challenge notions 
of privacy and publicity in the same way as new, emerging social spaces. Now, modern 
technologies, such as mobile phones and Internet access, have introduced new forms of 
socializing across the globe. From cyber cafés to informal music stores, Moroccan youth have 
access to spaces “unattached to the rules of a national culture and social hierarchy or a formal 
market,” and, through these spaces, assume the agency denied to them within the current social 
constructs (Cohen 2006:135). Women, especially, gain a new agency through means of these 
emerging, ambiguous spaces. They are granted more freedom of interaction within these public 
spaces, such as cyber cafés, and gain even more within the realm of social networking sites. 
New parameters are established in social networks through image and text. For example, 
Bahiyyih Maroon explores the social network of cellular phones and how they change the face of 
social interaction. She finds that mobile phones are “pathways to anonymity, mobility, and 
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individualism [and allow] greater opportunity for transgressing moralized social roles” (Maroon 
2006:189). Mobile telephones have made social interaction more intentional, and while mobile 
phones are still more pervasive across economic backgrounds than are social networking sites, 
these sites still offer similar social benefits. These methods of communication offer their users 
new possibilities for socializing and more agency—arguably more than do mobile telephones as 
these sites offer control not only over socializing but also over their own personas. The Internet 
is still, to a large portion of the population, an event. Cyber cafés are popular meeting places and 
are functional in the sense that many Moroccans access the Internet there. So, privacy settings, or 
new parameters of privacy (i.e. never posting a profile picture or using pseudonyms), are 
commonly created as social networks encounter these public spaces. These new definitions of 
social interaction have formed a new socialization, mediating the concepts of domestic and 
public expectations. 
These expectations are not only influenced by local culture but also by religiosity. For 
instance, a strict interpretation of Islamic texts forbids photography as the Arabic word surah 
translates into “image,” and Islam prohibits the creation of images because in the creation of 
animate portraits (beings with soul) lies blasphemous intent. There is a hadith that says those 
who create such images will go to Hell and there they will be told to put the soul into the image. 
While a liberal interpretation does not forbid photography, a conservative view can interpret the 
hadith as to also ban photography. This stricter interpretation considers photography a sin unless 
there is a dire need (passport pictures, for example). This interpretation potentially affects 
Morocco more than other North African nations as Morocco was the only country to ban 
photography until the reign of Abdul Aziz IV (r. 1908-1912). He was in his mid-teens when he 
came to power and was invested in the new technologies from England and France.  He 
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eventually brought in foreign experts and technicians to operate the devices and to train him in 
photography (Bottomore 2008).  
Nevertheless, even Berbers “would have been accustomed to seeing the photograph of 
the king of Morocco exposed in every public place from shops to street signs” (Vogl 2003:28). 
While traditional interpretations shape the modern hesitation with photography, Moroccans are 
still appropriating photography and understanding it in their own way. 
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3.0  EMERGING QUESTIONS 
 
Based on the literature and discussion above, I have conducted my research with a series of 
questions. Broadly, these questions were focused on understanding how college-age Moroccan 
youth were constructing their personas online.  
First, I wondered how Moroccans, especially women, were willing to present themselves 
online. The role that photographs play on social networking sites posed an interesting topic, and I 
wondered if religiosity or gender would factor into the comfort level and willingness to share 
images on these sites. In order to have a fuller understanding, I compared it to how women were 
presenting themselves in daily life. 
Next, I questioned the influence familial expectations have on the ways youth are using 
the sites. I wondered if societal expectations would differ across gender, and I also questioned 
whether this would impact the ways youth communicated through both word and image online. 
Further, I also wondered about linguistic concerns. I wondered if Moroccans would be 
more likely to navigate these sites in Arabic or French, and I wondered how this would compare 
with more formal and professional social networking sites. 
Finally, in the light of recent events, I looked to the February 20th Movement. In 
analyzing this event, I looked to see if there were any similarities between this more 
revolutionary context and the daily usage of social networking. 
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4.0  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In order to gather my own results, I worked with the Center for Cross-Cultural Learning in 
Rabat, Morocco as part of a study abroad with the School for International Training. The very 
nature of social networking and the forces that guide them are multi-layered and complex; so, 
this paper has inevitably and regrettably been a simplification. Limitations in scope and cultural 
and linguistic barriers must be considered in understanding my hypotheses. For instance, all of 
my field research was conducted in the city of Rabat, Morocco. 
My research relied heavily on interviews. The subjects were limited to university students 
in Rabat and other Rabatis with specific skill sets (i.e. photography, religious scholarship). These 
interviews lasted between a half hour and an hour. When necessary, follow-up interviews were 
made. The interviews were recorded with a handheld recording device. Males were much more 
willing to be interviewed than females; also, I was surprised by the number of interview subjects 
that asked to not be recorded, which limited the amount of notes recorded during the interview 
process. 
The interview process was conducted almost exclusively in English. When a question 
was not understood, I would translate it into Arabic or French, but the answers would be given in 
English. My biggest regret with the data collection is that my population for interviews was 
limited exclusively to those with a degree of fluency in English. This limited the backgrounds of 
those I talked to and colored the data. Interviewing in only English affected my results because it 
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did not allow for the same comfort as speaking in Darija or French would have and it also limited 
the demographic to those who studied English. 
I supplemented these interviews with more quantitative analysis in order to better 
comprehend the nature of social networks. I distributed surveys regarding uses of social 
networking to students in Rabat, Morocco whom I had not interviewed. The surveys were 
available in French and English. Copies of both are viewable in the appendix.  
I also viewed a sample of Facebook users in order to gain a new perspective of social 
networks. The sample was taken from people identifying themselves as living in Rabat, 
Morocco. The aim of this analysis was to examine their profile pictures in relation to their gender 
as I have found that the Facebook “names” are often changed and do not necessarily denote 
gender accurately. Thus, when the sample was analyzed, if their gender was not visible, the data 
was disregarded. The sample population consisted of Facebook users identifying their current 
city as Rabat, Morocco and was comprised of 90 females and 90 males. 
While in Morocco, I also took note of certain ways of dressing in daily life. I recorded 
these numbers in a series of tallies whose dates and locations are more clearly explained in the 
results section. This was done in order to allow readers to understand the significance of the 
statistics for online usage and presentation in comparison to the ways of presentation in daily 
life. 
Upon my return to the United States, I analyzed the data through SPSS, relying mainly on 
cross tabulation. The results of this process are the statistics present in the following sections. 
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5.0  RESULTS 
5.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL NETWORKING AND ISSUES OF 
SPACE AND PERSONA  
 
5.1.1 Ways of self-presentation in daily life 
Before turning to an analysis of online personas, I first consider how Moroccans present 
themselves in everyday life.  Such an analysis helps put in context my results about social 
networking since the ways Moroccans construct their daily personas shapes the ways they use 
social networking. These influences are especially clear in a gendered analysis as expectations 
and daily personas for women are distinct from those of men. Cultural and religious tradition 
influences the dress of all Moroccans but especially of women. 
My interview subjects had wide-ranging views about the hijab. One 20-year-old male 
university student, said, “as long as they’re covered, it doesn’t matter if they wear Western 
clothing or traditional clothing.” Another 20-year-old university student has a more stringent 
view of the proper wearing of the hijab. In comparing women wearing the hijab with jeans and 
other Western clothing versus traditional clothing, he said, “The first one… I don’t feel that she 
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wears it because she believes it.” He sees the women in a hijab and jeans as wearing the 
headscarf for cultural, social, or familial reasons rather than religious motivation. 
A 48-year-old mother who doesn’t use social networking herself said, “You believe in 
something that’s why you want to wear the hijab. I feel not… I feel that it’s not that I don’t want 
to wear the hijab, but I feel that I don’t need to. It’s something that I don’t see in my family. My 
mother was wearing the Moroccan scarf and the djellaba every time she want to go out until 
now. But me, I grow up with wearing the Western thing, never hijab, never the scarf. Maybe I 
wear the scarf when I want to pray. Then I cover my body. But I feel that I don’t need to wear it” 
[sic]. 
In addition to my interview results, I also collected data on women wearing the hijab in 
Rabat, the administrative capital of Morocco and the location of my research. On April 23, 2012, 
I analyzed the ways 188 women dressed within the medina qadeema contrasted with 244 women 
outside the medina walls. The trends of dress within the medina walls are notably different from 
the norms outside of the medina among younger girls (in a range from 20 to 40 years old). 
Throughout the world, women are often representative of the cultural standards; within Morocco, 
women tend to dress more traditionally than males, and these cultural conventions are most 
present in the traditional sectors of the city. 
 
Table 1:  The number of women wearing hijab 
 
Inside as compared to outside the medina walls  
 Inside medina Outside medina 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Hijab 120 63.8% 94 38.5% 
No hijab 68 36.2% 150 61.5% 
Total 188  244  
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Within the walls of the medina, the communal emphasis simultaneously encourages and 
allows a traditional form of dress. The majority of women—old and young—wear the hijab, and 
of those wearing the hijab, 65.8% also wore the djellaba. For those not wearing the djellaba, 
jeans (mostly dark washes) and leggings were popular, and colors tended to be neutral.  
While the men inside and out of the medina walls dress in a Western fashion, the public 
personas of women change once one crosses the physical boundary of the medina qadeema. 
Outside of the medina, four blocks away from the medina walls, I observed that a minority wore 
the hijab; of these, 19.1% wore the djellaba. More women wore make-up, and 11.3% of women 
without the hijab had lightened their hair. Overall, the younger women tended to dress in the 
Western style clothing associated with a global middle class while the older generation tended 
towards locally significant clothing. The younger women wore dark wash jeans, knee-length 
skirts, or black pants. 
Table 2: The number of women wearing hijab 
  
In city streets as compared to western-style mall  
 By Hassan II Mosque Inside Morocco Mall 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Hijab 52 54.7% 12 26.1% 
No hijab 43 45.2% 34 73.9% 
Total (N) 95  56  
 
  
In traveling throughout the country, other tourist cities had similar trends to those of 
Rabat. In Casablanca, for example, the majority of women wore the hijab in daily life, but within 
the setting of a western-style mall, most went without a head covering. None of the employees of 
western-style stores, such as American Eagle, wore hijab. In the first sample of women in 
various taxis and cars driving past the Hassan II Mosque, the majority of those wearing hijab 
also wore djellaba. In comparison, the majority of the women within Morocco Mall wearing 
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hijab wore western-style clothing. I only saw one woman wearing niqab, and she was in the first 
sample. In smaller, non-touristic cities, more women wore hijab and public spaces were male 
dominated.  
Though these observations must be understood within their proper context, they reveal 
trends crucial to understanding this research. Women seemed to respond to societal conventions 
in which it is socially acceptable for young women to wear traditional clothing while I was 
unable to observe any male under 40 wearing traditional dress. Within major urban areas, the 
only Moroccans wearing traditional garb in daily life were females, and the concentration of 
traditional dress is higher in the familial and traditional medina qadeema. These gendered 
expectations further translate into the world of social networks.  
The implications of these statistics can impact the persona of social networking in 
different ways. These implications are shaped by three major factors: gender, age, and 
presentation in daily life. The ways of self-presentation online can be shaped by gendered 
expectations, by the age of the user, and by the way they choose to present themselves in daily 
life. My surveys revealed that women are more hesitant to post their image online. This could be 
because of gendered pressures or simply because the type of woman that uses social networking 
would not post her image for personal reasons distinct from gendered expectations. Similarly, 
few women wore the hijab; this can be due to religious expectations or because the type of 
woman using these networks doesn’t wear the hijab in daily life. 
Again, we must realize that the hijab will not have a singular significance. This will 
further mean that the reasons Moroccan women are presenting themselves in daily life and online 
in certain ways will be impossible to reduce. It will be a matter of individual interpretation of the 
hijab and not necessarily motivated by religious reasons. As the Islamic scholar I interviewed 
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mused, “[Women in the past] were all Muslims, but did they wear the veil because they were 
Muslims or because they were Moroccans? That was the question.” 
5.2 OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL NETWORKING 
In beginning to assess the role of social networking within the Moroccan context, I wanted to 
first confirm the popularity of specific sites within the country. As earlier academic research has 
noted, Facebook is the most popular networking site within the North African region, and 
Morocco is no exception as 64.5% of my survey subjects indicated Facebook as their preferred 
social network and only 1.6% indicated Twitter. 
5.2.1 Ways of self-presentation online 
While Moroccan society remains gendered, social networking allows users to define their own 
boundaries between the domestic and public. Allowing users of both genders control over their 
profiles creates a new dynamic, but, even online, societal expectations distinguish the ways 
Moroccan men are using the sites as contrasted with Moroccan women. As Newcomb writes, 
many within Morocco “still associate women with domestic space, so that women’s occupation 
of public space is often inflected with attempts to redefine such spaces as partly domestic or 
private” (Newcomb, 296). As noted in the observations of daily dress, women are expected to 
present themselves in a more conservative, traditional way than males. Consequently, women are 
more cautious with their personas and the ways they communicate online; they tend to utilize 
and invent new modes of privacy. 
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For instance, the willingness to post photos is shaped by a variety of factors, and I 
analyzed the impacts of gender and religiosity. The results of the surveys I distributed within 
Rabat revealed 67% of all surveyed were willing to post photographs of themselves online. 
Moroccan males are generally more willing to post images of themselves on social networks 
such as Facebook as 82% of men were willing to post images of themselves online as contrasted 
with 53% of women. Further, in analyzing a sample of profile pictures, 67.8% of males posted 
images of themselves3 and not one left the profile on the default setting while 64.4% of females 
posted images of themselves as their profile picture and 7.2% left the profile picture on default. 
Overall, women were more likely to post images that were not of themselves; they had a larger 
range of alternative profile picture options (i.e. images of flowers, images of family members, 
leaving the image on the default setting) than their male counterparts.4 
Figure 5: The images Moroccan females post on Facebook 
 
                                                 
3 I hypothesized that these images were of the analyzed subjects because it matched gender and, if posted, age. 
However, I realize that there is a chance I misinterpreted the images. While it is likely these are images of the 
Facebook owner, it is not definite. 4 Of the females, 64.4% posted photographs of themselves; 10.0% posted photos of children; 6.7% posted photos of 
celebrities; 12.2% posted non-human images; 7.2% posted no image. Out of the 90 female profiles surveyed, only 4 
wore a head covering. Of the non-human images posted by females, the most popular image was floral (4 of the 11 
non-human images centered around flowers). Of the males surveyed, 67.8% posted photographs of themselves; 
4.4% posted photos of children; 10.0% posted photographs of celebrities; 16.7% posted non-human images; and 0% 
of the surveyed subjects left their profile picture on the default. I hypothesized that these images were of the 
analyzed subjects because it matched gender and, if posted, age. Soccer was the major theme for the images of 
celebrities and non-human images posted by males. 
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Figure 6: The images Moroccan males post on Facebook 
 
 
Generally, Moroccans who post pictures of themselves were also more likely to post 
pictures of their families. Drawing from survey results, I found that 655 of Moroccan Facebook 
users who were willing to post their own image were also willing to post images of family 
members. However, sometimes the decision to post images varied by the photograph’s subject. 
Of those who were not willing to post their own image, 17% would still post photographs of their 
family members. Some interview subjects explained that some Moroccans would post images of 
their family—especially children—online due to a sense of pride.  
Table 3: The Relation between Posting Photographs of Self and Family  Posts photos of self Does not post photos of self 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Posts family photos 26 65.0% 3 16.7% Doesn’t post family photos 14 35.0% 15 83.3% Total (N) 40  18  
 
Traditional, spatial expectations can explain this discrepancy as gendered expectations 
still shape social interaction, especially for those with a stricter interpretation of the Quran.  
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5.2.2 Religiosity and social networking  
Religion is a central part of people’s daily lives in Morocco. All survey respondents identified as 
practicing Muslims: most (58%) reported practicing “often,” and the remaining respondents 
(42%) reported practicing ‘sometimes.’ In addition, because the Moroccan state bases its law on 
Islamic tradition, religion becomes a force online. 
An Islamic scholar I interviewed considered that the hesitation with images online could 
be rooted in the way photography can be interpreted by conservative Muslims. He said, “You 
were talking to me about people giving their names or their pseudonyms […], and putting, for 
example, a tree in place of the picture. […] Maybe some of these people have this strict, narrow 
interpretation of the text and they wouldn’t like their pictures or a picture of any human to be 
posted on their personal page.” 
The survey results further suggest that religiosity impacts self-presentation online: of 
those who identified as regularly practicing, 54% were willing to post images of themselves 
whereas 87% of those who identified as practicing sometimes were willing to post images. 
Again, this can be explained by a stricter, Qur’anic interpretation as a strict interpretation can 
view photography as forbidden. 
The tepid support for photography may translate into the lack of photographic schools 
within Morocco. A 25-year-old self-taught photographer, said, “There are some schools, they 
teach art and photography is just a part of it. But they don’t really teach photography. It’s just 
once a week, and it’s the basics. So, most Moroccans go to study in Europe, America, or 
Canada.” Most photography students, he said, travel to France to study because of the comfort 
and familiarity of a shared language. While this statement is not entirely true—look at ESAV 
Marrakech (l’Ecole Supérieure des Arts Visuels), a private film school founded in 2007—a 
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cursory Google search is enough to illuminate the dearth of such programs. The most common 
hits are for photography holidays to Morocco and Spain rather than courses dedicated to training 
Moroccans themselves in photography; domestic photographic and film training, however, is 
rarer.  
The attention paid to photographs, especially those of females, mirrors the conflict 
between traditional expectations for women and pressures of globalization—or more accurately 
Turkization and Americanization. Turkish soap operas and American television shows are 
broadcast on the Moroccan network 2M; these showcase women dressed less conservatively than 
those in local programs. While the images and media pressures cannot be simply cast into a 
dichotomy of “traditional” versus “modern,” there remains an interesting conflict between 
cultural values that Moroccan women are reconciling in their own ways. While some women 
choose to have the “sexy” profile picture, others post themselves in conservative clothing; some 
refuse to post any image. 
5.3 THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FACEBOOK AND TWITTER IN TERMS OF 
SPATIALITY AND PERSONA 
As interviews revealed, the presence of the political and business worlds on Twitter is more 
pressing within the Moroccan context as interviews revealed. In an interview with a 28-year-old 
female university graduate, she explained that Twitter is not as popular because, “people are 
more interested in social media that can allow them to keep up with friends and chat at the same 
time and know about other people’s activities and things like that. […] Very few people even 
grasp the kind of extended things you can do with Twitter. They think, ‘Oh well, if I write that 
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kind of line and just tweet it, and no one responds or likes or adds a comment, they’re just not 
interested.’” 
Still, many organizations and political parties find the benefits in Twitter. The Party for 
Justice and Development (PJD) employee I talked with said, “Bloggers, most opinion makers, 
are on Twitter.” She said, “The quality of the users are in a high intellectual level. They are 
opinion leaders.” Due to the popularity of Facebook within Morocco, the PJD has twenty 
employees working on the official Facebook page; a single employee, however, manages 
Twitter. She mentioned that the party is now turning its focus to building a Twitter community. 
She said she wants to use Twitter in a similar manner to Facebook and have more people 
managing the Twitter account. However, she realized, “I cannot do that without a community.” 
Still, she said the PJD realizes the importance of using all the social networks as they 
complement each other in function and in terms of their target audience. “You must reach the 
opinion makers,” she said with a smile. The potential of Twitter can be summarized with one 
simple statistic: 5% of the users create 75% of the content (Bruck). If PJD and other Moroccan 
political parties can successfully navigate the transition from Facebook to Twitter, the 
possibilities are endless. 
5.3.1 The global nature of social networks within Morocco 
Especially for those who define globalization as an increase in worldwide connectivity, the 
global quality of social networking—a non-geographic location with a very geographic origin—
impacts social networking users and the ways they use these sites. These sites are new, intangible 
spaces but impacted by existing, external ideas. The way these sites are used is shaped not only 
by local forces but also by tensions of westernization and creolization. Westernization believes 
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the world is a neo-empire, a “transnational and hybrid” empire (Hensby 2011:81), in which 
Western nations shape global economy, politics, and culture. In contrast, creolization embraces 
the fluidity of cultures, notes that cultural forces become localized, and imbeds the western with 
local culture (Hensby 2011:127).  
In an immediate sense, the simple act of using these sites is an act of westernization, most 
clearly in the language and structure of social networks. While the language of these sites is 
adaptable, the default on Facebook—and most sites—is English. Further, as a consequence of 
colonization and the structure of these networks, a large number of Moroccans use Facebook in 
French because it facilitates online communication and because most use a French (or Western 
character) keyboard. A 25-year-old male government translator said, “If we grew up writing 
Arabic [on our computers], we would write in Arabic now. There are new programs, but we are 
used to [writing in French].” He explained that the majority of the upper and middle classes write 
in French while the lower class writes in either French or Arabic. This class distinction can 
correlate with access to education, as French is considered the language of education. He claimed 
French was the most common and, of those Moroccans I surveyed, most preferred French, with 
Arabic as a distant second. 
Table 4: Which language do you set your social networking site to? 
Dans quelle langue est-ce que votre réseautage est écrit?  Number Percentage 
French 28 45% 
Arabic 15 24% 
English 3 5% 
Arabic & French 1 2% 
Other* 14 23% 
Total (N) 61  
   *those who selected two languages or wrote in Tamazight 
 
While informal communications between youth are usually in French or Darija, official 
communication necessitates an increased focus on linguistics. For instance, groups like the 
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Justice and Development Party tweet in Arabic, French, and English. Darija is less commonly 
used as it is not yet standardized. Regional dialects like Darija are spoken languages and not 
readily standardized. Still, there is a new project aimed at standardizing Darija: KtbDarija 
(“WriteDarija”) is attempting to codify the phonetic approximation of Darija. Currently, without 
any standardization, the spelling of various words varies from one person to the next. Moroccan 
Arabic is rarely written and even more rarely seen in an Arabic script. Nevertheless, many 
Moroccans say there are no issues with comprehension as the transliteration system is generally 
coherent and cohesive enough. Numbers represent the letters that do not translate into the sounds 
found on a Latin keyboard; and while some spelling varies from person to person, issues of 
comprehension are not often born of the current, non-standardized phonetic transliteration 
system.  
The PJD employee said that in communication—especially online communication—the 
choice of language depends on the target audience. “The people on Facebook are using it in 
Arabic or French,” she said. While their Twitter posts in Arabic, French, and English, their 
Facebook posts almost exclusively in Arabic and French. Other groups similarly structure their 
language choices towards their audiences. The preponderance of Western languages and the 
social networking defaults speak to the Westernizing force of these social networks. 
Further, the layout of Facebook prioritizes imagistic representation. Conversely, 
throughout Moroccan history, more traditional interpretations of the Quran question 
photography’s morality. A site designed with an American clientele in mind inevitably shapes 
how Moroccans approach the site. While Facebook allows for adaptations, its structure 
inherently encourages a certain self-presentation. However, Morocco has historically had 
Western influence and incorporated aspects into their culture and politics. Morocco, for example, 
 39 
consistently engages with European Union initiatives first, which helped lead to its advanced 
member status in 2008 (Willis 2009). Thus, their appropriation of a non-Western site is not so 
foreign.  
While the format of the site implies Westernization, the Moroccan cultural values that 
permeate the networks act as creolizing forces. Although forces of westernization and 
polarization (in regards to the economic limitations of their user demographic) influence social 
networks, these sites have a democratic potential. Due to this democratic potential, they are a 
transnational space disposed to creolization as Moroccans invent their own norms on Facebook. 
These include privacy measures that transcend the provided settings, a different understanding of 
images, and adaptive communication channels. 
Within Morocco, channels of online communication revolve around privacy because of 
traditional concerns about family reputation. This privacy is constructed outside the provided 
security measures prescribed by the networks, notably on Facebook. On Facebook, Moroccans 
often change their user names (which on Facebook are the names visible and searchable to both 
friends and strangers) and communicate through the inbox rather than posting on walls. Whereas 
American youth tend to change their names to avoid being found by college admissions officers 
or employers, my interviews indicated that Moroccan youth fear their families finding their 
account.   
While westernization impacts social networking in Morocco, creolization has greater 
influence. Moroccans’ use and understanding of social networks and privacy is shaped by 
cultural understandings of space and persona, and the discrepancies between female and male 
online persona mimic the gendered personas of daily life. Further, Moroccans tend to understand 
 40 
and even criticize these networks through their own local lens. Traditional values shape their 
usage and concept of social networking.  
5.3.2 The creolizing forces on Facebook 
A 28-year-old female university graduate said, “Some take it just for the fun and do not want to 
run into somebody they do know. Especially if you’re considering that Facebook page as a way 
for you to just have fun and meet random people, random guys, and just talk to them. Some 
actually, either women or men are either married or engaged and sometimes have a webpage not 
with their real name. Or sometimes they have two Facebook accounts with almost the same 
name. One of them will be the one known to the family, with the bride, or the wife, the husband, 
or the family members. The other one just for, you know, maybe college friends, or something 
like that, or like girls or guys you met through chat rooms.”  
Changing the names is one of the ways that Moroccan youth strive to maintain a sort of 
privacy. This manifests itself in other ways, such as the style of communication. While American 
youth seem to feel comfortable writing on their friends’ walls, most Moroccans communicate 
with their friends through Facebook chat or through the inbox. As a 24-year-old female 
university student explained, “It’s private. You cannot see some stuff that everyone will see.” 
She said that she posted on the wall for vague niceties, such as birthday wishes or telling 
someone she misses them. However, if she had something to truly communicate, she said she 
would send a message.  
Both males and females believed relationships were to be initiated by the male. While a 
few males like the male 18-year-old university student said that a female could begin the 
Facebook flirtation, he described it as “rare.” Facebook offers the youth a space to interact 
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without the cultural and traditional pressures and restrictions surrounding visible dating culture. 
The inbox offers a privacy and intimacy that cannot happen on the street, where most 
interactions are brief and fleeting catcalls and other varied harassments.  
While the cyber-dating scene has created a more immediate agency—as females noted 
they often had the power to respond or ignore a male suitor—gendered expectations impact not 
only how personas are created but also how they are perceived. Both women and men have the 
power to define their relationship status. When asked if Moroccan females would update their 
relationship status, a 28-year-old female university student said, “If you’re using it as that page 
to sort of like meet guys, you definitely do not want to put on your status that you already have a 
guy, if you know what I mean.” She continued to explain that she believes most men would only 
update their relationship status once they were married. However, she clarified, “They never 
mention the name. They just say ‘married.’ It wouldn’t say ‘married with,’ and give you the link 
to the woman’s webpage. […] Sometimes they’re preventing friends from checking out their 
wives’ pictures, or how the wife looks like, or her webpage, or something like that.” A 24-year-
old female university student confirmed that relationships are more routinely updated only for 
serious commitments. When I asked if she updated her status, she replied, “When I was engaged, 
yes; when I was in a relationship, yes. But I was in a serious way, you know?” A 21-year-old 
female university student explained that the control over relationship status was used as most 
people “don’t want for other people to know it. Like I’m in a relationship, and I don’t want to put 
it in Facebook. I think it’s something personal. And this is really a chance for you to publish the 
things that you want to publish, so you have a certain privacy in it.” 
There is also control over the images social networking users can make visible. For 
instance, the hijab is a rarity on Facebook. Most girls who choose to post profile pictures of 
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themselves do not wear the hijab. I was able to interview one woman who wears the hijab, and 
she said she would never post an image of herself. She said Facebook was simply to 
communicate with family and friends; so, there was no reason for her images to be online. She 
said that to post an image was to look for a boyfriend or husband. While most interview subjects 
felt that it was not unnatural for a woman to post a photograph of herself in the hijab, a few did 
find the notion odd. An 18-year-old university student who chooses to not wear the hijab, said, 
“Most of the girls with hijab do not make their photos there. With the real hijab” [emphasis is 
hers]. She said that these women were very cognizant of their religion; so, they would not then 
post images of themselves online. The Islamic scholar I talked with further elucidated this 
phenomenon and viewpoint when he said, “When you use the hijab to attract, then it is no longer 
the hijab.” Most subjects, especially female interviewees, believed that profile pictures were the 
space for a ‘sexy’ photograph. Thus, for girls with the “real hijab,” to post an image would run 
counter to cultural expectations for what both the hijab and what the profile picture should mean. 
When asked why people were compelled to choose non-human images as their profile 
picture, two 20-year-old male university students had responses of a similar vein. The first said 
that these people, male and female, feared they would not be accepted for themselves. “Photos,” 
he said, “are a means of communication.” So, not having an identifiable profile picture makes it 
more difficult to communicate with these persons in his opinion. The other said, “He’s not 
confident in himself, of his looks.” When prompted to consider why females would select non-
human images, he said, “It can be that she’s Muslim... When she has the hijab, it’s not good to 
show your photo like that.” He believes that it is not good for any Muslim woman, veiled or 
unveiled, to post pictures of herself so liberally. When asked if his friends posted photographs of 
themselves as their profile picture, he said emphatically, “Yes, all of them.” I then asked if any 
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of his female Facebook friends wear the hijab in their profile pictures. After considering for a 
moment, he said, “I saw accounts of girls who wear the hijab, but in my friends there is not” 
[sic].  
However, most males did not associate the lack of a profile picture with a more 
conservatively religious girl. In fact, most contended in the interview process that this happened 
when a girl was unattractive. Even the female interviewees seemed to have reached a consensus 
similar to the male interviewees. A 20-year-old female university student, said, “Some girls, 
because they are ugly, so they don’t post their photo.” The 20-year-old male university student 
said, “Most girls post photos of like… Justin Bieber.” When asked why he thought this was the 
trend, he replied that the girl was “not cute” or her face was not photogenic. 
Even knowing that some Facebook users refused to post photographs because their 
family had access to their sites, the trend was for the subjects to believe people—namely 
females—would not post their photographs because of their attractiveness level. The stereotype 
and bias often focused on feminine beauty with both male and female interview subjects using 
the feminine pronoun “she,” even when the question was phrased as: “What do you think about 
people who do not post their picture in Facebook?” The interview subjects mostly agreed that a 
girl would not post her photographs because she was not beautiful enough; many subjects also 
pointed out that a girl would not post her pictures if she had skin problems (i.e. acne). 
5.3.3 The public nature of social networks and the local, communal values 
These networks are understood differently within the society: the youth tend to embrace the 
networks while the older generation is more cautious about the new community that has formed. 
While the communal forces of daily life tend to encourage or at least permit traditional personas 
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(i.e. how women in the medina qadeema are more likely to wear hijab), the online community 
encourages a reinvention of space and thus a reinterpretation of traditional personas. Social 
networking via the new media is creating new social dynamics, and some members of the older 
generation see this as a threat to the existing social system. Yet, Moroccan youth, while willing 
to use the sites, still either observe traditional expectations in the ways they use the networks or 
obscure their deviations through the privacy channels.  
These networks redefine the meaning of social relationships. “Maybe I’m an old version 
or the old generation, but I find it uncomfortable to be in front of a machine like this. I think [the 
youth] need more human contact,” said a 48-year-old mother, who herself does not have a 
Facebook account. She expressed also concern for her eight-year-old son to begin using these 
networks: “[I am worried for him] to have influence from […] bad people […]. People who want 
to have good sexual relationships. But I try to protect my son by giving an education. […] This I 
think will help to make the distinction between the good and the not good things. And I think it’s 
very important that he understand that” [sic]. Online relationships are less public and 
consequently less regulated. While in daily interactions the community can intervene for safety 
and moral reasons, most Moroccans use the most private channels of communication available 
online. So, they create a private public space that, while influenced by traditional values and 
morals, cannot be governed by them. 
While my survey results showed that 71% of the parents are aware of their child’s social 
networking sites, the interviews clarified that most parents seem to be absent from monitoring 
their children’s Facebook. A 28-year-old female university student said, “My dad just hears, 
‘Facebook, Facebook.’ He doesn’t know what Facebook is. I just showed him the page once. He 
was like, ‘What is this?’ I was like, ‘It’s just like a page I have all my friends from college on so 
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I could keep up with and a few pictures.’ I didn’t show him, of course, all the pictures because 
he’d think I’d be crazy to post that many pictures. I know he’d say, ‘Why did you post all those 
pictures for people to see?’” Similarly, a 24-year-old female student said, “My dad, he always 
thinks things about Facebook. ‘Ah, pictures! Careful! There’s like Photoshop and blah, blah, 
blah. They post things on Facebook.’ But he does not have a Facebook.” Whether a consequence 
of their disinterest or their children’s fear of showing them, it appears that few monitor these 
sites. 
Some of the interview subjects justified their pseudonyms online by saying they did not 
want their family to find them. When, however, they interacted with their family members on 
their accounts, there was even more hesitation in posting photographs. An 18-year-old female 
university student, who has posted photographs on her Facebook page, explained her rationale in 
considering which photographs to post: “[My parents…] would not be… okay with this.” She 
expressed the fear of her parents—especially her father—finding out that she has posted 
photographs of herself online. This, she said, was the main motivation for not using her real 
name on her Facebook account.  
Even though the 48-year-old mother showed concern about her son using Facebook in the 
future, she realized he would be likely to create an account. She said, “I know he will have a 
page in the Facebook and it’s normal because it’s this generation… if you would not have this, I 
would think maybe there is a problem. It is something that, now, this generation, they need this 
and they need to have this. But maybe I will see or I will watch [his Facebook page].”  
However, a 39-year-old unmarried uncle, said, “They should not have [a Facebook 
account]. This is dangerous to them. There are people who forget Allah in Facebook.” As a man 
who identifies strongly as a Muslim, he is very aware of the dangers of Facebook. He himself 
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used his page for his automobile business and explained that Facebook should be used “for 
something useful, not anything funny.” While some parents and guardians have reconciled 
themselves to the idea of Facebook, they are generally more wary of the inherent dangers to the 
social networking system. His concept of usefulness—which he translated as use for commercial 
marketing—is also emerging among entrepreneurial youth. Interview subjects who engaged in 
independent work—such as music or photographic careers—explained that they used these 
social networking sites predominantly to advertise their work; the social aspect became 
secondary for their purposes. 
Along with the increasingly widespread usage of social networking is coming a more 
cautious view of the online world. Most people mentioned that their parents—especially the 
fathers of females—were wary of sites like Facebook. Further, even the youth themselves were 
beginning to become more cautious; the older the interviewee was, the more cautious and aware 
they were. Females were more cautious than males and were less likely to interact with a 
stranger online. Unlike the male interview subjects, most of the females said they would never 
accept a request from someone they did not know. However, a number of them admitted that 
they knew plenty of girls who would have no such qualms. There are three major possibilities 
motivating this response: 1) they really do know a number of other young women willing to 
accept requests from strangers and are unwilling to do so themselves, 2) they were 
uncomfortable admitting to an interviewer that they have accepted requests from strangers, and 
3) their response points to a trend of women being more apt to judge other women more harshly 
than is accurate. Nevertheless, throughout my interviews, the female subjects were unwilling to 
accept a friend request from a stranger. 
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For most Moroccan youth, the social aspect is the most important and beneficial aspect of 
these sites. The new dynamics of space have reinvented the face of romantic relationships as well 
as social relationships in general. The male subjects approached a consensus in saying Facebook 
was an ideal dating site. While some males and females interviewees denied using Facebook to 
start their own romantic relationships, the majority said they had many friends who used 
Facebook as a dating site. The new dynamics of space are changing the way women and men are 
interacting with each other and grant each a new form of agency. With attention to the public 
nature of these profiles, youth are presenting themselves in new ways that address local 
expectations while also considering new, global influences and expectations. 
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6.0  DISCUSSION 
6.1 BACKGROUND ON THE FEBRUARY 20TH MOVEMENT  
Huntington wrote in 1968 that: “The higher the level of education of the unemployed… the more 
extreme the destabilizing behavior which results.” A research study conducted by Filipe R. 
Campante and Davin Chor investigates this claim within the context of the Arab Spring. Their 
basic conclusion is that the improvement in education progression and completion among 
various Arab societies is a crucial developing factor in the Arab Spring. Expanding education 
explains the high presence of students in the protests throughout North Africa and other Middle 
Eastern nations. Within Morocco during the February 20th movement, students were a main 
subaltern class of the protests and were able to embody the social unrest and to reclaim their 
culture. Campante and Chor note the Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, “whose act of 
protest marked the start of the Arab Spring, was himself rumored to be a university graduate. 
Although this detail about his schooling was apocryphal, the fact that the rumor gained such 
traction is revealing of the strong current of job-related discontent amongst university graduates 
in Tunisia” (Campante, 174).  
Campante and Chor explain why education and protest are linked. For one, because 
students have the opportunity to achieve higher levels of education, they often possess higher 
political motivation and investment. Further, the higher levels of unemployment mean that this 
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generation of educated, unemployed youth has the time to devote to the demanding process of 
protest. The unemployment fuels their personal involvement; the education fuels their belief in a 
right to employment and encourages their political awareness and involvement. Further, the high 
societal levels of unemployment and other social inequalities subjugate various subpopulations, 
including these unemployed graduates, and thus allow them the time in which to develop a 
collective protest voice. The frustration with the neoliberal policies and their apparent incapacity 
to ameliorate the poverty and unemployment issues historically and currently has intensified into 
the most recent wave of Moroccan protests. 
As explored by Campante and Chor, the rate of unemployment is a motivating factor in 
the emergence of revolutions. The Economist Intelligence Unit released a study in 2011, which 
was the year of the February protests, noting the economy “lost 84,000 jobs over the previous 12 
months […with the unemployment rates higher] among the young (particularly the urban young) 
and the educated” (“Morocco economy,” 1). They continued, writing that 19.5% of urban youth 
aged 25 to 34 suffered from unemployment, and 33% of those aged 15 to 24. The rate for 
graduates was also high, at 18.2% (“Morocco economy”).  
Across North Africa, main protest groups varied. In Tunisia, the demonstrations surged 
towards the capital from the neglected rural areas, strengthened by the once powerful but since 
repressed labor movement; the demonstrations in Libya were fueled by an amalgamation of rebel 
groups, which spoke to the tribal and regional fractures that have been endemic to the country for 
years (Anderson, 2). Although urban youth were present in revolutions throughout North Africa, 
they played especially prominent roles in the Egyptian and Moroccan protests.  
Regarding protest demographics, the high population of unemployed, urban youth did not 
bode well for the Moroccan government, especially when they compared this high percentage 
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with similar rates across their politically unstable neighbors. Maddy-Weitzman writes, “…the 
February protests raised the specter of Morocco going down the same road as so many other 
Arab states and unnerved the authorities.” With this specter immediate and tangible in their 
minds, government officials responded in three distinct ways: first, they initiated proactive 
measures, such as increasing subsidies on basic goods and promising government jobs for recent 
graduates); second, they permitted peaceful protests to continue while slandering the name of the 
protesters in a simultaneous effort; and finally, they employed occasional police violence 
(Maddy-Weitzman, 3).  
In the countries where the urban youth were more active in protests, social networks were 
much more often utilized. One reason is the issue of access. There are current efforts to extend 
mobile phone coverage into the nation’s rural regions; currently, coverage is most reliable in 
urban centers (Maroon 190). The coverage for Internet is less prevalent in Morocco than that of 
mobile phones; so, social networking users are even more concentrated in urban centers. Still, 
this lone factor of polarization of access cannot be read as poverty. While it does point to an 
unequal development and an unequal investment throughout the country, it is important to 
distinguish between this inequality and the concept of poverty. After all, “Culturally perceived 
poverty need not be real material poverty: sustenance economies, which satisfy basic needs 
through self-provisioning, are not poor in the sense of being deprived” (Shiva). Nevertheless, this 
aspect of development is an important factor to consider when examining the protests and social 
networking in general within Morocco. 
Within Morocco, initial protests were in solidarity with the Egyptian rebels; inspired by 
this success, the date of February 20th was advertised on social networking sites as the day of 
Moroccan protest. The protesters would decry the current political, social, and economic 
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situation in their call for constitutional reform. One of their demands was for the king’s role “in a 
future constitution to be of a natural size,” but their real target was the makhzen ( ), 
which is the elite, wealthy power structure surrounding the monarch (Tremlett). While similarly 
“untouchable,” the makhzen were doubtlessly more tangible than the monarch himself. In 
essence, the ruling elite became an easier target as the kingship contained more symbolism. The 
monarch was shielded by a certain level of prestige and religious legitimacy as the line claimed 
to be descended from the prophet Muhammad. There is a worldwide tradition of challenging the 
government while the monarch remains unscathed: often by both the monarch, who is apt to 
blame the ministers for the problems, and the populous, who direct their protests at the ruling 
elite surrounding the king. This is a key difference from the revolutions of their neighbors, who 
similarly found fault with the figureheads (who were not kings) and made them the symbols 
embodying the corruption and inequalities within the nations.  
Nevertheless, when the preventative measures proved ineffective, the government 
embarked on a series of reforms that many critics believe stayed the violence that could have 
erupted. The constitutional reforms, while beneficial to a degree, were often nominal changes. 
One such change was that the king relinquished his “sacredness” and divine right; instead, he 
deserves his people’s respect as he now is tauqeer ( ), which translates roughly to 
something deserving of reverence and adoration. However, this change must be qualified. Article 
46, which defines the king’s “sacredness,” had read, “The person of the King is inviolable and 
sacred.” Now, the translation depends upon the language of the constitution as it is written in 
both French and Arabic. The French version says “La personne du Roi est inviolable, et respect 
Lui es dú. (The King’s person is inviolable, and respect is owed to Him),” while the Arabic 
version reads, “The King’s person is inviolable, and ihtiram [respect] and tauqeer are owed to 
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him.” The phrase ihtiram wa tawqeer is a familiar, ancient one that has been associated with 
those who claim descent from Mohammed himself. While tauqeer can translate as “respect,” if it 
is meant as a synonym for ihtiram, “one wonders what they are doing in the same sentence” 
(Benchemsi 2012:62). 
While these were some of the major issues raised by the movement, the February 20th 
Movement attracted protesters of varied backgrounds. Thus, social networking became a crucial 
tool for mobilizing protests and creating a coherent—if less complex and nuanced—voice. 
Nevertheless, the protest movements needed to focus on overarching themes to facilitate the 
protests, and social networking provided the space not only to organize but also for individuals to 
have a platform to voice their own opinions. 
6.2 HOW MODERN POLITICAL PROTESTS SUPPORT THE FINDINGS 
Through the lens of the Arab Spring, social networking can also be understood as a tool for 
subaltern emancipation. These spaces became popularized further through their use in other 
North African countries, and this enhanced their potential for evolutionary and revolutionary 
emancipation. As a 28-year-old female university graduate said, “Very few people actually knew 
what Twitter is until the February 20th movement started happening like everywhere else. And 
then you started reading articles or seeing videos about how Twitter and Facebook helped rise 
with the protest. And everyone was like, ‘Oh, what is this Twitter thing?’ And then they started 
looking into it, along with the Facebook, and they started seeing pages of like… young activists 
from Tunisia or Egypt, mostly like Tunisia, people started getting interested in it with Tunisia. 
They started seeing a different way of using social media that’s always been thought of as… kind 
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of the cyber-dating scene. That’s when the kind of way of dealing with social media started 
switching in Morocco as well.” Within Morocco, initial political protests were in solidarity with 
the Egyptian rebels; inspired by this success, the date of February 20th was advertised on social 
networking sites as the day of Moroccan protest.  
While Morocco treats its media more liberally than other countries, there are still issues 
of freedom of the press. Ali Anouzla was taken to court for writing an article on the king’s 
health, and his newspaper was closed down. He said, “There are no independent newspapers left 
now” (Tremlet 2011). Similar cases occurred in 2011 and 2012. In July 2011, an issue of the 
French newspaper Le Courrier was banned for a cartoon of the King. He is known for jet skiing, 
and the cartoon by Khalid Kadar caricatured his hobby, placing him on a sea of money (CRNI 
2012). Then, in February 2012, 18-year-old Walid Bahomane was brought before court for 
posting caricatures of King Mohammed VI on Facebook; he was accused of “defaming 
Morocco’s sacred values.” This charge has recent precedence from a 2008 case when Fouad 
Mourtada was sentenced to three years for impersonating King Mohammed VI’s brother on 
Facebook (Almiraat 2012). However, Walid Bahomane’s case and the ban of Le Courrier were 
censorship cases that came after the constitutional reforms.  
Still, the issue of censorship is not simply a matter of the governments. It is crucial to 
remember that Facebook is a business and its focus is not the political potential of the site but 
rather the potential income. A recent case happened in October 2012 when Facebook removed 
two photos of Dana Bakdounes from the Facebook group “The Uprising of Women in the Arab 
World.” The images were part of the group’s move to show women who had chosen to remove 
their hijab. Group administrators received notifications of misconduct and were suspended; 
while the official reason for the removal of the photos is unclear, a Facebook spokesperson 
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released a statement saying “a user was mistakenly suspended for posting an image showing 
personal identification, since users aren’t allowed to post others’ personal documents. It was later 
determined that the person in the photo uploaded it to Facebook” (Facebook Censors Arab 
Women 2012). 
While Facebook is also a site of censorship, Moroccans continue to use social networking 
as a form and source of more liberal media. A 21-year-old female university student said, “There 
is not a big freedom of speak in the press, in the magazines; so, we can talk about [political 
issues and social movements] in Facebook. It’s like a little anonymous. But in the press, we 
cannot talk about the political problems.” The social networks do not simply create an arena for 
Moroccan youth to discuss political ideas and frustrations, but they also allow them to coordinate 
their efforts. “[The protestors] do a lot of stuff: monitoring and coordinating demonstrations (go 
to this place, go that place) they have sites even for some of the officers and soldiers who 
participated in beating the demonstrators, photos, and names. It breaks the fear culture,” said 
Professor Saad Sariq, who monitors online activism (Amos 2011). As in other North African 
countries, the social networks became an ideal space to organize people from disparate cities and 
backgrounds to coordinate real-life protests. A 28-year-old female university graduate said, 
“They’re using Facebook to comment about political event, or have forums and discuss about 
issues. They do use it to inform about protests that are going to be taking places, events, or post 
videos of political individual—like a guy or a person from a political party or somebody with 
political connotations saying something about the movement—it’s mostly to just inform but also 
create, again, that space where everyone can talk freely about stuff.” Political groups realized 
and utilized social networking sites as a tool to increase awareness and motivate solidarity. It is 
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important to realize that the networks relied on the success of these physical protests; social 
networks may not have “caused” the Arab Spring, but they certainly did facilitate it.  
Even through an evolutionary lens, emancipation happens on various levels; women, for 
instance, have a more immediate power through the romantic relationships born and sustained 
through social networking sites. Further, the political use of social networks evokes the social 
use in its attention to community. While the social use focuses on the local community, the 
political attends more to the regional community. Facebook groups like “SlutWalk Morocco” 
(which also organized a protest in Rabat in March 2012) and the group for Amina Filali are 
gaining popularity. Amina Filali was a young, sixteen-year old girl who killed herself with rat 
poison after being married to her rapist. The Moroccan law allows victims of kidnapping to be 
married to their kidnapper. However, because of the social stigma attached to the loss of 
virginity, a misinterpretation of this law often marries rape victims to their rapists. Amina’s death 
motivated young women to vocalize their resentment and frustration with the legal situation that 
allowed this to happen. One Facebook group created in protest is called “We Are All Amina 
Filali,” a name exceptionally parallel to the Egyptian Facebook group “We Are All Khaled 
Said,” a page designed to honor the man whose death is hailed as the catalyst of the Egyptian 
revolution. He was killed after a brutal beating because he recorded Egyptian police sharing 
drugs from a drug bust. 
Though the Facebook groups for Amina Filali have a relatively broad support base in 
comparison to other political pages, the images of the girl herself are few. Unlike the “We Are 
All Khaled Said” page, which posts a number of images and videos and uses Khaled in most of 
its profile pictures, the “We Are All Amina Filali” page places more emphasis on the text posts. 
Even a simple Google search reveals the difference: the Amina Filali search returned 4 out of 15 
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photos of her; 2 of those 4 were different sizes of the same image; all 4 were images of other 
people holding a photograph of Amina. From a search for Khaled Said, however, out of 16 
images, 9 were images of Khaled. There were 2 main images that were circulated: the autopsy 
photograph and a studio portrait of him. 3 out of 9 images juxtaposed the autopsy photograph 
with the studio portrait; 3 out of the 9 were images of protesters holding his image. There was 1 
image out of the 16 that was a tribute to him on the Berlin Wall; 3 political cartoons featuring 
Khaled; and 2 images were of his mother. This discrepancy in the number of images could either 
reflect the historically tenuous relationship between Moroccans and photography or the different 
gendered expectations regarding self-presentation. 
However, these sites are successful examples of women becoming more politically vocal 
on social networks. A 21-year-old female university student said she believes women are 
involved in the political pages on Facebook. “Yeah, this was really happening in Morocco 
because we have so much with the women’s situation in Morocco. […] I think girls were really 
affected by [the Amina Filali case],” she said. “We talk about it a lot on Facebook. We try to find 
a solution for that, to do something to create an association, to help the girls who were raped to 
talk to their family, to convince them to not choose the easy way, to help their daughter. We try. 
It’s really hard in Morocco to defend a political vision, but we try. Just the fact that we’re talking 
about it on Facebook… let people react about it and change a little bit of the moralities.” 
The protests since 2011 have structured their use of social networks off Egyptian success. 
However, the adaptations to the local context have made the use of social networking unique to 
the Moroccan context. It is difficult to ascertain whether the social networks were not used as 
effectively within Morocco or if political concessions made by the king after the initial protests 
were enough to dissuade protestors. As the 21-year-old female university student explained, “I 
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have a lot of Tunisian friends, and I was talking with them on Facebook and we study together. 
We just are studying, and they tell me, ‘Ah, look what happened in that city. It’s near where I 
live. Look what happened, what is happening.’ So they see this in real time; in the minute that 
happened, they see the video. In Tunisia, if there were not YouTube or Facebook, I don’t think 
that people would react that harshly, and go out in the streets and protest.” She believed that 
other North African nations had “more problems than [Morocco]” because the king was able to 
stave off revolution. While some protest groups in Morocco are more critical of the king’s 
involvement, most turn their criticism to the Makhzen. While the protest groups use these 
networks to promote local interests, the way the protestors are evoking a communal solidarity 
shows they recognize these networks as a way to access a broader, regional and global support.  
Recent events have shaped how Moroccan individuals and organizations are shaping 
usage. Not only has the regional event of the Arab Spring influenced social networking usage, 
but political events across the globe have also influenced Moroccan social networking. For 
instance, the Party for Justice and Development Party employee explained that she was 
structuring her candidate’s campaign in a way similar to the successful 2008 Obama campaign. 
She continued in explaining how social networking was changing, saying, “We were using social 
networking individually. We were using a strategy of bombarding Facebook and being present. 
Now, we want presence, but we want to work to have interaction. That is different.” She said that 
there were now interns working on analyzing the social networks to better appeal to their target 
audiences. She said that it didn’t take an intern, however, to realize that they have received more 
interaction with their posts when photographs accompany them, “especially on Facebook.” The 
images attract the audience to read the text accompanying the image. “The more we have 
images, the more we have comments or likes,” she said.  
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The 28-year-old university graduate said that the way North African countries began 
using social networking politically seemed unnatural to her. She said, “I think they’re following 
the Western… or even Middle Eastern way of doing it. It feels like… it definitely was kind of a 
copy-paste, that’s what I feel. Because before, Moroccans were involved in like Facebook or 
Twitter only as a social means, or a way to meet people.” As Fauad explains, “Although the 
interest in sex might be the initial reason one segment of young Arab users joins Facebook, its 
importance diminishes quickly, giving way to a more complicated and serious interest departing 
from social relations founded on sexual desire” (Fauad 2009:91). 
As was seen in the example of the Amina Filali page, it does seem that the political 
movements find their inspiration from other successful models and simply try to transplant them 
into Morocco. Similarly, like in other Arab countries, the political organizations use multiple 
social sites in slightly different ways. Twitter in Morocco has a more intellectual demographic as 
well as the international audience, meaning that Arabic posts are often accompanied by French 
and English translations.  
Facebook has given women a chance to become more vocal. In an evolutionary manner, 
that has accelerated its pace during this period of revolution, women are becoming more active 
on social networking sites. They are creating pages like “SlutWalk Morocco,” which aims to end 
street harassment. Through Facebook, women have also become more political, albeit in a more 
evolutionary manner.  
The Arab Spring that radically changed the layout of many other countries has inspired 
Moroccans to become more politically active in their daily lives as well as their online lives. As 
the PJD employee said, “Young people in Morocco are using it as a way of release. They are 
saying we believe in freedom.” Social networking sites have created a newer political youth and 
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a new generation of politically active females. It has changed the shape of political protests 
forever.  
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7.0  CONCLUSIONS  
In many ways, social networking users within Morocco approximate the global middle class in 
the ways they dress, their acceptance of Western languages, and their preference of an American-
made social network. Yet, although the influence of the global middle class is undeniable, 
current usage is largely influenced by creolizing forces. The cultural values of Moroccans and 
Americans are disparate, and thus, the American sites cannot homogenize Moroccan society. 
Instead, local concepts of spatiality, gender, and community permeate the networks. While 
internet usage remains a global phenomenon, the increased pressure of presentation placed on 
Moroccan women will likely continue. Although expectations may evolve with time and social 
networks may impact this change, I still believe that these networks are incapable of 
transcending gendered expectations. As Moroccan society has a familial orientation, I do not see 
the communal concern disappearing as a consequence of these Western networks. The most they 
can do is modify them. Moroccans will likely still utilize privacy settings with concern for 
familial reputation and will adapt their pages based on whether or not they use them to interact 
with their families.  
Nevertheless, though the main concern now appears to be familial concerns, I 
hypothesize that, if the population of urban unemployed youth decreases, there will be increased 
attention to the potential professional capacity of these networks, which is already evident in 
independently entrepreneurial youth. I believe that Moroccan youth will again adapt the ways in 
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which they use these networks and use official and unofficial privacy settings to address these 
concerns.  
Throughout North Africa, youth have been interacting on these networks and adapting 
them to their own local context. While there are similarities across the region, each nation has its 
own adaptation. For instance, despite comparable circumstances, the revolutions within Morocco 
never reached the violence or achieved the persistence that occurred in other countries during the 
Arab Spring. While social networks were utilized as part of Moroccan political protests, they 
were not utilized in the same way as in other countries. Instead, the Moroccan use of social 
networking in a social and political context enacted gradual change.  
Taking the example of the Amina Filali page, the evocation of a communal region in the 
structure, while asserting the Moroccan agenda, is the political translation of social networks’ 
evolution. Just as Moroccans use the site for individual purposes—be it social, dating, or 
business—they still attend to the communal, especially regarding privacy settings. Morocco’s 
protest movement addresses specifically domestic concerns while structuring their arguments in 
communal rhetoric. Spatiality has always impacted Moroccan social interaction and continues to 
shape not only daily use but also political use. Forces familial and communal, traditional and 
modern, national and transnational impact social networking. 
While social networks can never be the sole motivating agents of social change, they do 
seem to be an increasingly relevant factor. Social networks have been a subaltern emergence, 
giving the youth a platform to express themselves socially and politically. Youth have molded 
these sites based on their cultural values and have shown that these networks are subject to 
creolizing forces. Regionally, Moroccans are one of the most active countries on these networks. 
While they have not attracted the Western media attention other nations have, Moroccans have 
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been using these networks in emancipatory ways. Even though their protests never reached the 
same violent climax as their neighboring countries, Moroccans have used these networks to 
adapt local ways of organizing space. They have—in a revolutionary way—imbibed these sites 
with their own reconciliation of the distinctions between the public and private. The subaltern 
youth have assumed a unique form of agency through these sites and have created and will 
continue to create a new force of spatial awareness that will undoubtedly have its own impact on 
Morocco and its place in global society. 
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APPENDIX A 
NOTES ON LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The very nature of social networking and the forces that guide them are multi-layered and 
complex; so, this paper has inevitably been a simplification. Further limitations in scope and 
cultural and linguistic barriers must be considered in understanding my hypotheses. For instance, 
all of my field research was conducted in the city of Rabat, Morocco. 
Furthermore, due to the qualitative nature of this research, I relied heavily on interviews. 
The subjects were limited to university students in Rabat and other Rabatis with specific skill 
sets (i.e. photography, religious scholarship). These interviews lasted approximately anywhere 
between a half hour and an hour. When necessary, follow-up interviews were made.  
In an analysis of Moroccan Facebook photos, a basic trend emerged. The sample was 
taken from people identifying themselves as living in Rabat, Morocco. The aim of this analysis 
was to examine their profile pictures in relation to their gender as I have found that the Facebook 
“names” are often changed and do not necessarily denote gender accurately. Thus, when the 
sample was analyzed, if their gender was not visible, the data was disregarded. The sample 
population consisted of Facebook users identifying their current city as Rabat, Morocco and was 
comprised of 90 females and 90 males. 
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The interview process was conducted almost exclusively in English. When a question 
was not understood, I would translate it into Arabic or French, but the answers would be given in 
English. My biggest regret with the data collection is that my population for interviews was 
limited exclusively to those with a degree of fluency in English. This limited the backgrounds of 
those I talked to and colored the data. 
Further, males were much more willing to be interviewed than females; also, I was 
surprised by the number of interview subjects that asked to not be recorded, which limited the 
amount of notes recorded during the interview process. 
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APPENDIX B 
SURVEYS 
Study on Views of Social Networking 
 
 
This is a voluntary survey designed to gain an understanding of how females in North Africa utilize social 
networking. I am looking for data collection that will get the opinions of both males and females regarding this issue. 
The completion of this survey is voluntary and the data collected from it is anonymous and confidential. If you are 
under the age of 18, please do not complete this survey. Please do not write your name anywhere on this survey.  
Here are terms important to understanding the survey: 
Social networking:  an online service that is used to create a group of people with similar interests. It often 
includes a profile or some way for its users to identify themselves. 
Profile Picture: on Facebook, it is the main photo of you that appears as a thumbnail next to your 
comments and other activity around Facebook. 
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These are a series of 21 questions designed to better grasp the usefulness and usage of social networking in Northern 
Africa. Please remember you can abstain from answering any question that you do not desire to answer. Only one answer is 
needed for each question. 
 
 
1. What is your gender? 
 Male 
 Female 
 
2. What is your age?   ________________ 
 
3. What is your preferred form of social networking? 
 Twitter 
 Facebook 
 YouTube 
 Myspace 
 Blogs (in general) 
 Dating site, matchmaking site 
 Other:                                     
 
4. What is your relationship status? 
 Single 
 In a relationship 
 Married 
 Divorced 
 Other:            
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5. Are you a practicing Muslim? 
 Yes, often 
 Yes, sometimes 
 No 
 Other:            
 
 
 
6. What is your primary language? 
 
 Spoken: ____________________________________________ 
  
 Written: _____________________________________________ 
 
7. What is your major (specialization) in university?  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
8. How often did you actively use social networking in the last week, meaning 
posting or commenting? 
 0 
 1-2 
 3-5 
 6-10 
 11-15 
 71 
 16-20 
 21-25  
 25+ 
 Other:                       
 
9. How often did you non-actively use social networking in the last week, meaning 
simply logging on? 
 0 
 1-2 
 3-5 
 6-10 
 11-15 
 16-20 
 21-25  
 25+ 
 Other:                       
 
10. Do you post pictures of yourself on your social networking site? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
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11. If yes, how important is the clothing you are wearing in the photographs of 
yourself?  
 Very important 
 Somewhat important 
 Not at all important 
 Other:                      
 
12. Are you willing to be seen in clothing that is more revealing than you would in 
daily interactions? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
 
13. How much do you judge others based on the clothing they wear in their 
photographs? 
 Very much  
 Somewhat yes 
 Somewhat no 
 Not at all 
 Other:                      
 
14. Do you feel comfortable showing the skin of your arms and/or legs in the 
photographs posted on the social networking sites?  
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
 73 
 
15. Do you feel comfortable showing your hair in the photographs posted on the 
social networking sites? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
 
16. What is your view of a female your age that has her hair uncovered in the 
photographs posted on the social networking sites?  
 Positive view 
 Negative view 
 Neither negative nor positive 
 Other:                      
 
17. What is your view of a female your age who does shows the skin of her arms 
and/or legs in the photographs posted on the social networking sites?  
 Positive view 
 Negative view 
 Neither negative nor positive 
 Other:                      
 
 
 
 
 
18. Is it better to wear traditional or religious clothing in profile pictures? 
 74 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not important 
 Other:                      
 
19. Do you post pictures of family and friends on your social networking site? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
 
20. How many social networking sites are you currently a member of? 
 1 
 2-5 
 6-10 
 11+ 
 
21. How many social networking sites do you frequently use? 
 1 
 2-5 
 6-10 
 11+ 
 
22. Have you used social networking to find a boyfriend/girlfriend? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
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23. Do you believe social networking is beneficial? 
 Very beneficial 
 Somewhat beneficial 
 Neither beneficial nor harmful (neutral) 
 Somewhat not beneficial 
 Not at all beneficial 
 Other:                      
 
24. Are your parents or guardians aware of your social networking sites? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other:                      
 
25. Which language do you set your social networking sites to? 
 Arabic (al-fusha) 
 French 
 English 
 Other                      
 
26. Which age group do you believe uses social networking the most regularly? 
 10-14 
 15-19 
 20-29 
 30-39 
 40+ 
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Thank you for your participation. If you have any additional comments or thoughts, please use the 
space provided to respond. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L’enquête de la Vue de Réseautage Personnel 
 
 
C’est l’enquête volontaire est pour comprendre comment les femmes en la Maghreb utilisent la réseautage 
personnel. Je cherche pour des hommes et des femme que concernant ce problème.  Le achèvement de cette 
enquête c’est volontaire et les données accumule de cette c’est anonyme et confidentiel. Si vous étés les mineurs 
(moins que 18 ans), sil vous plait, ne remplissez pas cette enquête. Sil vous plait, ne écrivez pas votre nom en cette 
enquête. 
 
C’est les termes important pou la compréhension de cette sondage. : 
Réseautage Personnel : un site sur l’Internet qu’on utilise pour la création de un groupe de peuple aux 
intérêts similaire; souvent, inclut profil ou une méthode pour les peuple intéressée se identifier. 
Photo du profil: en Facebook, est la principale photo de vous affichee sur votre profil qui apparaît sous 
forme de miniature à côté de vos commentaires et de toute autre activité dans Facebook. 
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Ci-dessousune sérié de 26 la questions va essayer pour la compréhension de la réseautage personnel en 
la Maghreb. S’il vous plait, vous souvenez que vous pouvez ne répondrez pas de question que vous ne désirez pas 
répondre. S’il vous plait, notez quelques questions autorisent case multiples être marqué.  
 
 
1. Quel est votre sexe? 
 Homme 
 Femme 
 
2. Quel est votre âge?   ________________ 
 
3. Quel est votre forme de l’enquête préfère? 
 Twitter 
 Facebook 
 YouTube 
 Myspace 
 Les blogs (en general) 
 Site de rencontres 
 Autre:                                     
 
4. Quel est votre statut relation? 
 Unique 
 Dans une relation 
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 Marié 
 Divorcé 
 Autre:            
 
5. Vous un musulman pratiquant? 
 Oui, souvent 
 Oui, parfois 
 Non 
 Autre:            
 
 
 
6. Qu’est-ce que votre langue principale? 
 
 Parle: ____________________________________________ 
  
 Ecrit: _____________________________________________ 
 
7. Quel est votre majeur dans l’université?  
 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Dans la semaine passée, combien de fois avez vous utilisé activement la 
réseautage personnel (c’est-a-dire écriture ou commentaire)? 
 0 
 1-2 
 79 
 3-5 
 6-10 
 11-15 
 16-20 
 21-25  
 25+ 
 Autre:                       
 
9. Dans la semaine passée, combien de fois avez vous utilisé pas activement la 
réseautage personnel (c’est-a-dire seulment se connecter) ? 
 0 
 1-2 
 3-5 
 6-10 
 11-15 
 16-20 
 21-25  
 25+ 
 Autre:                       
 
 
 
10. Est-ce que vous publiez des photos de vous-même sur votre réseautage 
personnel? 
 Oui 
 Non 
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 Autre:                      
 
11. Si oui, de quel niveau de l’importance ont les vêtements ont? 
 Très important 
 Plutôt important 
 Ne important du tout 
 Autre:                      
 
12. Etes-vous prêt a être vu dans l’habillement qui est plus révélateur que vous le 
feriez dans les interactions quotidiennes? 
 Oui 
 Non 
 Autre:                      
 
13. Comment est-ce que vous jugez les autres au sujet des vêtements qu’ils 
portent dans leurs photos ? 
 Beaucoup   
 Plutôt oui 
 Plutôt non 
 Vraiment pas 
 Autre:                      
 
14. Comment sentez-vous sur montrant la peau de vos bras ou des jambes dans 
les photos postées sur les sites de réseautage social?  
 Oui 
 Non 
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 Autre:                      
 
15. Comment sentez-vous sur montrant vos cheveux dans les photos postées sur 
les sites de réseautage social? 
 Oui 
 Non 
 Autre:                      
 
16. Quel est votre point de vue d'une femme de votre âge qui a les cheveux 
découverts dans les photographies publiées sur les sites de réseautage social?  
 Point de vue positif 
 Point de vue négatif 
 Ni positif ni négatif 
 Autre:                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17. Quel est votre point de vue d'une femme de votre âge qui ne montre la peau de 
ses bras ou des jambes dans les photos postées sur les sites de réseautage social? 
 Point de vue positif 
 Point de vue négatif 
 Ni positif ni négatif 
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 Autre:                      
 
18. Est-il préférable de porter des vêtements traditionnels ou religieux dans les 
photos de profil? 
 Oui 
 Non 
 Pas important 
 Autre:                      
 
19. Est-ce que vous publiez des photos de votre famille et vos amis en votre 
réseautage personnel ? 
 Oui 
 Non 
 Autre:                      
 
20. Combien de réseautages personnels est-ce que vous en êtes un membre ? 
 1 
 2-5 
 6-10 
 11+ 
 
21. Combien de réseautages personnels est-ce que vous en utilisez souvent? 
 1 
 2-5 
 6-10 
 11+ 
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22. Est-ce que vous utilisez les réseaux sociaux pour trouver un petit ami/petite 
amie? 
 Oui 
 Non 
 Autre:                      
 
23. Vous croyez que le réseautage est bénéficial? 
 Très bénéfique  
 Plutôt bénéfique  
 Plutôt non bénéfique 
 Ne bénéfique de tout 
 Autre:                      
 
24. Est-ce que vos parents sont conscients de vos réseautages personnels? 
 Oui 
 Non 
 Autre:                      
 
25. Dans quelle langue est-ce que votre réseautage est écrit? 
 Arabe  
 Français 
 Anglais 
 Autre :                      
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26. À votre avis, quel groupe de l’âge utilise le réseautage le moins 
fréquemment ? 
 10-14 
 15-19 
 20-29 
 30-39 
 40+ 
 
 
Je vous remercie pour votre participation. Si vous avez des commentaires supplémentaires ou des 
pensées, s'il vous plaît utiliser l'espace prévu pour répondre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
